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Actor Preference and the Implementation of INS v.
Chadha
Darren A. Wheeler*
ABSTRACT
The initial uproar over the Supreme Court‘s decision to invalidate
the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha was deafening. Many feared that
such a decision would wreak havoc on the public policymaking process
but these fears never came to pass. In many cases Congress ignored the
Court and continued to pass legislative vetoes. The executive branch,
while often offering token objections, also continued to work as though
the legislative veto was still part of the policymaking process. Why did
these actors responsible for implementing the Court‘s decision in this
case fail to fully and faithfully do so? This article argues that both
congressional and executive branch actors had their own preferences that
overrode their motivation to implement the Court‘s decision. As a result,
these actors largely ignored the Court‘s mandate. By examining this
compliance failure in the context of the Chadha case it is possible to
explore the inter-branch dynamics that can be involved in the
implementation of a Supreme Court decision that directly affects the
other two branches of government.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 1983 the Supreme Court struck down the legislative
veto by a 7-2 margin in the case of Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) v. Chadha.1 Reaction to the Court‘s decision was swift.
Some members of Congress called the decision ―statute shattering,‖ and
many scholars believed that Chadha would be a substantial blow to
congressional oversight power.2 Congressional unhappiness with the
Court‘s decision in Chadha was clearly evident from the outset.
Michigan Senator Carl Levin was quoted as saying: ―This decision is

* Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science and Public Admin., The Univ. of North Florida.
1. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
2. Darren Wheeler, Implementing INS v. Chadha: Communication Breakdown?, 52 WAYNE
L. REV. 1185, 1186 (2006).
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going to cause a lot of conflict and chaos.‖3 Unhappy at the thought that
Congress had lost a valuable oversight tool, die-hard veto proponent
Representative Elliott Levitas asserted that Congress would put the
Administration on a very short leash.4
Even the justices themselves appeared to appreciate the potential
gravity of their decision. When later queried about the 1982-1983 term,
Chief Justice Burger responded that Chadha was the most important case
the Court decided ―especially in the long run . . . Chadha is certainly
among one of the fifty most important cases in our history.‖5
Despite the Supreme Court‘s decision, Congress continued to include
legislative vetoes in statutes.6 In the first sixteen months immediately
following Chadha Congress added an additional fifty-three legislative
vetoes.7 Over two hundred more were added through 1993.8 One
commentator dryly noted that ―Chadha may prove to be as effective in
limiting legislative vetoes as the Eighteenth Amendment was in limiting
the consumption of alcohol.‖9
By the time the Court announced its decision in Chadha, the
legislative veto had become a popular oversight tool incorporated into
hundreds of statutes by Congress as an oversight measure.10 The Court‘s
invalidation of this tool threatened not only these statutes but also
threatened to disrupt the policymaking relationships between Congress
and executive branch agencies.11 However, Chadha did not turn out to be
as devastating as many had feared.12 This was due in part to the fact that
Congress and executive agencies were somewhat reluctant to implement
the Supreme Court‘s decision. This article explores why executive and
legislative branch officials fail to faithfully and fully implement the
Chadha decision.

3. Supreme Court Decision That Stunned Congress, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 4,
1983, at 14 [hereinafter Stunned Congress].
4. Sharp Shifts in Congress Practices and Legislative Conflict Predicted, N.Y. TIMES, June,
24 1983, at A1 [hereinafter Sharp Shifts].
5. BARBARA H. CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 232
n.27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1988).
6. Louis Fisher, Judicial Misjudgments About the Lawmaking Process: The Legislative Veto
Case, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 705, 706 (1985).
7. Id.
8. Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 273, 273 (1993).
9. MICHAEL MEZEY, CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 170 (Westview
Press 1989).
10. William West & Joseph Cooper, The Congressional Veto and Administrative
Rulemaking, 98 POL. SCI. Q. 285, 286 (1983).
11. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1002 (1983).
12. Wheeler, supra note 2.
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Even if courts clearly articulate a decision, there are still a number of
other variables that can affect the implementation of that decision.13
Many political and legal scholars argue that the preferences of those
responsible for implementing a judicial decision are a key element of the
overall implementation picture.14 The Chadha case provides a good
example of a case where many of those responsible for the
implementation of the decision clearly did not agree with the Court.15
This article explores the hypothesis that executive and legislative
officials had their own preferences that overrode their motivation to fully
and faithfully implement the Court‘s decision. In other words, actors
responsible for implementing a judicial decision often have other
preferences that influence their behavior aside from the Court‘s
directions, preferences that may override any interest they would have in
fully implementing the Court‘s decisions.
Part I of this article introduces the subject and the research question.
Part II will briefly outline the history and use of the legislative veto. This
will provide context for the Supreme Court‘s Chadha decision. Part III
will review the judicial implementation literature that focuses on
organization approaches to the implementation of judicial decisions. Part
IV will focus on the Chadha decision itself in order to see just what it
was that Congress and the executive branch had to work with in the wake
of Chadha. The reactions of both executive branch officials and
Congress will then be reviewed in Parts V and VI. What actions were
taken and what reasoning was given for them? Did these actors articulate
conflicting preferences that affected their ability and willingness to
implement the Chadha decision? In Part VII, a brief case study, The
Treasury Act of 1992, will illustrate how congressional and executive
preferences shaped policymaking in a post-Chadha national government.

13. See, e.g.,BRADLEY CANON & CHARLES JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION
(CQ Press 1999).
14. See, e.g., CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13; BEN M. CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART,
AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LITIGATED REFORM IN TEXAS PRISONS, (Univ. of Texas Press 1989);
GEORGE EDWARDS, III, IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY (CQ Press 1980); STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE
IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES (Dorsey Press 1970);
Lawrence Baum, Implementation of Judicial Decisions, 4 AM. POL. Q. 86 (1976); James Spriggs,
Explaining Federal Bureaucratic Compliance with Supreme Court Opinions, 50 POL. RES. Q. 567
(1997) [hereinafter Federal Bureaucratic Compliance]; James Spriggs, The Supreme Court and
Federal Administrative Agencies: A Resource-Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact, 40
AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122 (1996) [hereinafter Supreme Court]; Donald Van Meter & Carl E. Van Horn,
The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework, 6 ADMIN. & SOC‘Y 445 (1975).
15. See Stunned Congress, supra note 3; Sharp Shifts, supra note 4.
AND IMPACT
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
The legislative veto is essentially a generic name for a number of
different types of actions designed to provide a measure of congressional
control over the manner in which the executive branch implements a
statute.16 While a legislative veto can take a variety of forms, it is
―essentially . . . a clause in a statute, which says that a particular
executive action . . . will take effect only if congress does not nullify it
by resolution within a specific period of time.‖17 Through legislative veto
provisions in statutes ―Congress simultaneously reserved the power to
block specific exercises of this authority by passage of resolutions which
were not submitted for presidential review.‖18
The legislative veto was originally employed during the Hoover
Administration.19 At that point in time, it was primarily used for
executive branch reorganization.20 Prior to this, Congress had to pass
legislation authorizing any executive reorganization.21 As time passed,
Congress discovered additional uses for this new oversight tool. By the
time Chadha was decided in the mid-1980s, the legislative veto was a
part of over two hundred statutes.22 These statutes included over three
hundred separate veto provisions.23 The Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Act of 1974 and the War Powers Act of 1973 are but two
of the more prominent acts that contained legislative vetoes.24 The
legislative veto became such a popular oversight tool that vetoes became
boilerplate language added to hundreds of statutes without really much
thought about how such provisions would affect the implementation of
the statutes in question.25 As a result of this proliferation in the use of the
legislative veto, it was no small matter when the Supreme Court decided
to rule on the constitutionality of the legislative veto in Chadha.

16. See CRAIG, supra note 5.
17. Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L. J. 785, 785 (1984).
18. Michael J. Horan, Of Train Wrecks, Time Bombs, and Skinned Cats: The Congressional
Response to the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 13 J. LEGIS. 22, 22 (1986).
19. BARBARA H. CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF
REGULATION 16 (Westview Press 1983).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. West & Cooper, supra note 10.
23. Id.
24. For a partial list of statutes containing legislative vetoes see the attached appendix to
Justice White‘s dissenting opinion in INS v. Chadha 462 U.S. 919,1003–13 (1983) (White, J.,
dissenting).
25. Wheeler, supra note 2, at 1189.
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III. ACTOR PREFERENCE AND JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION
Compliance with judicial decisions is not something that can be
taken for granted any more than a supervisor can assume that her
instructions will be followed to the letter or a district office will follow
the directives of the home office without fail. The Framers of the
Constitution recognized this potential problem. In Federalist #78,
Alexander Hamilton argued that the judicial branch of government was
―beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power . . . .
It may truly be said to have neither force nor will but merely judgment;
and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for
the efficacy of its judgments.‖26 Courts must rely on others to implement
their decisions. This can be problematic when a judicial decision is
unpopular as evidenced historically by the furor surrounding
controversial Supreme Court decisions such as those involving school
prayer and school desegregation.27 This section will review the various
organizational approaches that have been employed in the judicial
implementation literature. These approaches will examine the
relationships between higher and lower courts, courts and executive
agencies, and courts and Congress in the context of judicial
implementation.
Organizational approaches to the analysis of the implementation and
impact of judicial decisions are ―based on the idea that although it is
individuals who make acceptance and compliance decisions, they often
do so in the context of organization goals and policies.‖28 Research in
this area has focused on a variety of organizational factors such as cost,
organization structure/location,29 and factors external to the
organization.30 Additionally, individual factors such as how officials
understand the decision, the cost of compliance, agreement with the
decision, the obligation to comply, and the official‘s personal interests
have all been explored as variables that affect the implementation of
26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465–66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books 1961).
27. See, e.g., KENNETH DOLBEARE & PHILLIP HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1971); RICHARD JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE: SUPREME
COURT DECISION–MAKING FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE (Northwestern Univ. Press 1967); WILLIAM
MUIR JR., PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Univ. of Chicago Press 1967); J.W. PELTASON, FIFTYEIGHT LONELY MEN (Univ. of Illinois Press 1971); Michael W. Giles & Douglas S. Gatlin, Mass
Compliance with Public Policy: The Case of School Desegregation, 42 J. POL. 722 (1980); Michael
W. Giles & Thomas G. Walker, Judicial Policy-Making and Southern School Desegregation, 37 J.
POL. 917 (1975).
28. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 173.
29. See STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (4th ed.,
Nelson–Hall 1993).
30. Van Meter & Van Horn, supra note 14, at 525.
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judicial decisions.31 Two areas that have historically received the most
attention of judicial scholars are the organizational relationship between
the Supreme Court and lower courts,32 and the relationship between
courts and bureaucratic agencies.33
A. Relationships Between Higher and Lower Courts
Judicial scholars examining the relationship between the Supreme
Court and lower courts have often concluded that lower courts are
constrained to some degree by Supreme Court decisions and feel
compelled, for a variety of reasons, to abide by these decisions. Specific
organizational approaches have included tension,34 bureaucratic inertia,35
and principal-agent models.36 The general approach revolves around the
idea that the hierarchy of courts is similar to bureaucratic hierarchies in
that the decisions of the higher element affect the lower elements.37 To
the degree that this is correct, it may mean that the implementation of
judicial decisions is similar to that of the implementation of policies
within bureaucracies more generally and that there is some value in
looking at possible linkages between the two.38
If lower court judges do feel somewhat constrained by higher court
decisions, why might this be the case? Organization theorists often focus
on the sense of professionalism that the vast majority of lower court
judges have.39 This sense of professionalism usually guides the judicial
decision-making process rather than personal predilections about certain
decisions with which they disagree.40 It also helps to maintain the
integrity of the judicial system.41 No lower court judge likes to have
31. Baum, supra note 14, at 97; Van Meter & Van Horn, supra note 14, at 472; see also
WASBY, supra note 29.
32. See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 14; Lauren Bowen, Attorney Advertising in the
Wake of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977): A Study of Judicial Impact, 23 AM. POL. Q. 461
(1995); Charles A. Johnson, Judicial Decisions and Organization Change: Some Theoretical and
Empirical Notes on State Court Decisions and State Administrative Agencies, 14 L. & SOC‘Y REV.
27 (1979); Donald Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of
Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994).
33. See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 14; Supreme Court, supra note 14; Federal
Bureaucratic Compliance, supra note 14.
34. See Johnson, supra note 32.
35. See Songer et al., supra note 32; CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 14; Bowen, supra
note 32.
36. See Songer et al., supra note 32.
37. Baum, supra note 14, at 87–89.
38. Id.
39. Baum, supra note 14, at 101.
40. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 38.
41. Id. at 37–39; see also Songer et al., supra note 32 (discussing a study using a PrincipalAgent Model to reach similar conclusions).
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decisions reversed by higher courts and several scholars have concluded
that there is evidence to support the contention that the authority of
higher courts is unusually strong in judicial organizations.42
In reality, higher courts have very few tools at their disposal when it
comes to sanctioning lower courts and judges.43 It is persuasion, often via
opinions,44 that higher courts usually use in their efforts to keep lower
courts in line.45 This relative freedom is largely due to the insulation that
most judges enjoy. Federal judges are subject to very few external
sanctions.46 This gives them an exceptional amount of leeway in the
performance of their duties, enough to lead some judicial scholars to
maintain that influence is a two-way street between upper and lower
courts.47
Despite these pressures to acquiesce to Supreme Court decisions,
political scientist Lawrence Baum argues that judicial policy preferences
can result in non-compliance with higher court decisions.48 Baum
contends that there is no reason to assume that policy preferences by
those in the judicial system should differ radically from actors in other
organizations.49 Judges may hold strong opinions or policy preferences
like any other organizational actor; such strong opinions may lead lower
court judges to defy higher court rulings.50 There is some evidence to
support this contention.51

42. Baum, supra note 14, at 101; Songer et al., supra note 32, at 777–91. For a good
discussion of the ―upper court myth‖ see also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND
REALITY IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM (Princeton Univ. Press 1950). Others argue that lower
courts do have some influence of higher courts. See, e.g., Walter Murphy, Lower Court Checks on
Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1017 (1959).
43. Baum, supra note 14, at 105.
44. Id. at 95.
45. Id. at 105–07.
46. Id. at 105.
47. Traciel V. Reid, Judicial Policy-Making and Implementation: An Empirical Examination,
41 W. POL. Q. 509 (1988).
48. Lawrence Baum, Lower Court Responses to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a
Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208, 215 (1978); see also Baum, supra note 14, at 101.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 100.
51. Lawrence Baum, Specialization and Authority Acceptance: The Supreme Court and
Lower Federal Courts, 47 POL. RES. Q. 693 (1994).
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B. Relationships Between Courts and Executive Agencies
A handful of scholars have studied the relationship between courts
and administrative agencies in the context of implementing judicial
decisions.52 It is the duty of the legislative branch to pass laws and the
job of the executive branch of government, often via executive agencies,
to carry out those laws. Executive branch agencies often do this with a
great deal of discretion.53 Often it is the courts that determine when
executive branch agencies have abused this discretion.54 When courts
rule on statutory or constitutional matters relating to executive agency
actions, these agencies are expected to comply.55
Although one might initially think that agencies automatically
comply with court decisions, Martin Shapiro warns that ―the student of
judicial-administrative politics must be prepared for a world of mutual
influences rather than sovereign commands.‖56 Shapiro notes that courts
typically allow agencies to do as they please and that when they do act
they are only one political actor among many.57 Furthermore, while
courts and agencies influence each other, they rarely press their claims in
an effort to force confrontation. James Spriggs argues that general
absence of executive agency defiance of Supreme Court decisions is a
result of the highly interdependent relationship between the two.58 These
actors must deal with each other on a repeated basis, so it is in the
interest of both to maintain a non-confrontational relationship.59 Because
of this desire for inter-branch comity, the study of the relationship
between courts and administrative agencies is mostly a study of marginal
cases.60
Despite this generally non-confrontational relationship, tension can
result when court opinions run contrary to an agency‘s mission or
goals.61 As early as 1970, Stephen Wasby hypothesized that
―[c]ompliance is more a function of norms in affected organizations than
it is of Supreme Court rulings.‖62 Agency goals and preferences can
52. See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 14; Supreme Court, supra note 14; Federal
Bureaucratic Compliance, supra note 14.
53. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 271
(MacMillan 1968).
57. Id. at 265.
58. Federal Beuracratic Compliance, supra note 14, at 567.
59. Id.
60. SHAPIRO, supra note 55, at 265–68.
61. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 82.
62. WASBY, supra note 14, at 257.
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color responses to judicial decisions.63 When an agency is committed to
certain defined goals and preferences and is faced with a judicial
decision instructing it to go against these preferences, tension results.64
James Spriggs found support for the proposition that agency preferences
affect executive agency compliance with Court decisions in his analysis
of Supreme Court opinions that reversed or remanded a federal agency
decision from 1953–1990.65
Agency norms, especially the preferences of agency actors
responsible for implementing judicial policies, can be a vital aspect of
successful policy implementation.66 There are three elements that can
affect the disposition of the implementing populations. First, those
responsible for implementing a judicial policy must understand what it is
they are supposed to do.67 Second, their immediate acceptance or
rejection of the court‘s decision is vital.68 Finally, the intensity of the
response is an important factor.69 Sometimes judicial decisions may fall
within a ―zone of indifference‖ and will be implemented simply because
no one feels very strongly about them.70 Many scholars contend,
however, that ―barring other constraints or pressures, groups that support
a judicial policy will implement the policy faithfully; those that do not
will either ignore it or resist its implementation, wherever and whenever
possible.‖71 Agency actors must have a desire to implement the judicial
decision. Something must motivate them. If there are psychological
and/or material costs associated with changing policies in response to a
judicial decision without specific direction, officials will often adopt
policies that benefit them or ignore a court decision altogether.72
This article draws on the research that explores the implementation
of judicial decisions by executive agencies but it also goes one step
further. The inter-branch relationship between the judiciary and Congress

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 82.
WASBY, supra note 14, at 173–74.
See Supreme Court, supra note 14.
CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 82.
Van Meter & Van Horn, supra note 14, at 472–73.
Id. at 473.
Id.
EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 90.
CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 82; see also DOLBEARE & HAMMOND, supra note
26; EDWARDS, supra note 14; PELTASON, supra note 27; WASBY, supra note15; Baum, supra note
14; Federal Bureaucratic Compliance, supra note 14; Supreme Court, supra note 14; Van Meter &
Van Horn, supra note 14.
72. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 69; Lawrence Baum, Implementing Judicial
Decisions: An Organizational Perspective, 4 AM. POL. Q. 1, 86 (1980); see also PELTASON, supra
note 27. This is also evident in many of the school prayer impact studies. See e.g., CROUCH &
MARQUART, supra note 14, at 235; DOLBEARE & HAMMOND, supra note 27; JOHNSON, supra note
27; MUIR, supra note 26; Johnson, supra note 32, at 27–29.
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is also central to an examination of the implementation of the Chadha
decision.
Despite the trail of notable confrontations, only a small percentage of
court decisions ever receive widespread negative attention from
Congress.73 As is often the case though, it is the exceptions to this
general rule that have historically received the most scholarly attention.74
C. Relationships Between Courts and Congress
As early as the 1960s, scholars sought to stress the differences
between ―anti-court‖ reactions and ―anti-decision‖ reactions.75 Anti-court
reactions, those aimed at changing the size of the Court or changing its
jurisdiction, are relatively rare while anti-decision reactions are much
more common.76 William Eskridge found that each Congress since 1975,
on average, has enacted legislation to modify or overturn roughly a
dozen Supreme Court decisions dealing with the interpretations of
statutes.77 Despite this activity, Harry Stumpf notes that hostile
congressional reaction usually occurs in response to constitutional
rulings by the courts as opposed to statutory rulings.78 This may be
because statutory rulings can be overturned, or clarified, with less
conflict than is often engendered in attempting to pass a constitutional
amendment in response to a court decision.79 Several scholars contend
that the congressional game in anti-court legislation is ―largely bluff,
huff and puff‖80 or merely an exercise in ―position-taking.‖81

73. HARRY STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS, 416 (2d ed. Prentice Hall 1998);
WASBY, supra note 14, at 203.
74. See WALTER MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT (Univ. of Chicago Press 1962); C.
HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT 1957–1960 (Univ. of Minnesota
Press 1961); STUMPF, supra note 73; WASBY, supra note 14; Joseph Ignagni & James Meernik,
Explaining Congressional Attempts to Reverse Supreme Court Decisions, 47 POL. RES. Q. 353
(1994); Richard A. Paschal, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the Supreme
Court, 8 J. L. & POL. 143 (1991); Harry Stumpf, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings:
The Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. PUB. L. 377 (1965)..
75. STUMPF, supra note 73, at 416–19.
76. Id.
77. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L. J. 331, 335 (1991).
78. STUMPF, supra note 73, at 419.
79. Constitutional amendments aimed at overturning Supreme Court decisions are relatively
rare but they do occur. For examples, see the histories surrounding Amendments Eleven, Fourteen,
Sixteen, and Twenty-Six. This tactic was also attempted in response to the Chadha decision without
success. See e.g., CRAIG, supra note 19.
80. STUMPF, supra note 73, at 425.
81. Paschal, supra note 74, at 202. And for a detailed discussion of congressional ―positiontaking‖ see DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (Yale Univ. Press 1974).
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Some researchers also note that these negative responses to court
decisions appear to come in ―waves or crisis periods‖ and usually
involve a wide range of congressional participants.82 Others argue that
electoral considerations sometimes play a key role in the decisions of
members to actively oppose Supreme Court decisions.83 Several of these
factors were likely at work in the Chadha case. Many considered the rise
of the regulatory state in the late 1970s to indeed be a crisis, and the
response to Chadha was certainly not isolated to a few members of
Congress.84 Some argued that the legislative veto was a powerful
symbolic tool for congressional members, one that they could point to as
a means to control the federal bureaucracy.85 Such rhetoric would
certainly resonate for incumbents in congressional elections.
Political scientist Richard Paschal writes that there are three basic
ways for Congress to limit a Supreme Court decision without directly
addressing the policy at issue in the decision: First, Congress can opt not
to appropriate the money necessary to enact the decision.86 Second,
Congress can choose not to implement (or just partially implement) the
decision.87 Finally, Congress can just refuse to comply.88 The final two
options were certainly employed by Congress to varying degrees in
response to the Court‘s Chadha decision.89
As this brief review has revealed, a number of scholars have
examined the organizational factors that affect the implementation of
judicial decisions. This article will build on the work related to the
implementation of judicial decisions by administrative agencies by
examining the executive branch response to the Court‘s Chadha
decision. Did they express preferences that prevented them from
faithfully implementing the Court‘s decision? At the same time, we will
review congressional responses as well. As a result, this research
broadens the scope of the literature by examining a new case and at the
same time exploring the inter-branch dynamics associated with the
preferences of both executive and legislative officials responsible for
implementing the Court‘s decision.

82. STUMPF, supra note 73, at 419.
83. Ignagni & Meernik, supra note 74.
84. See CRAIG, supra note 19; MARTHA LIEBLER GIBSON, WEAPONS OF INFLUENCE: THE
LEGISLATIVE VETO, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE IRONY OF REFORM 39 (Westview Press
1992); JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION 34 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996).
85. Jessica Korn, The Legislative Veto and the Limits of Public Choice Analysis, 109 POL.
SCI. Q. 873, 892 (1994).
86. Paschal, supra note 74, at 198 n.202.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Wheeler, supra note 2.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT‘S INS V. CHADHA DECISION
A. Background
As is seemingly common in constitutional law, landmark cases often
emerge from events that seemed minor at their inception.90 Jagdish
Chadha was lawfully admitted to the United States on a non-immigrant
student visa in 1966.91 Chadha‘s visa expired in 1972 and less than one
year later the District Director for INS filed an Order to Show Cause why
he should not be deported from the United States.92 At the 1974
deportation hearing Chadha conceded that he was deportable but was
given leave to file an application for suspension of deportation pursuant
to Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.93 Chadha‘s
deportation hearing was resumed and eventually the immigration judge
ordered that his deportation be suspended based on the fact that Chadha
had met statutory requirements allowing him to remain in the United
States because he had ―resided continuously in the United States for over
seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer ‗extreme
hardship‘ if deported.‖94 Pursuant to statute, the Attorney General
reported the suspension of deportation to Congress.95
Upon receiving the Attorney General‘s recommendation for the
suspension of deportation of immigrants such as Chadha, Congress had
the right via Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to
veto the decision of the Attorney General.96 On December 12, 1975,
Congress did just that when Representative Joshua Eilberg (D-PA)
introduced a motion opposing ―the granting of permanent residence in
the United States to [six] aliens.‖97 Included in this group, for reasons not
articulated in the congressional record, was Jagdish Chadha.98 The
resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote.99 Neither the
Senate nor the President was required to take any action on the matter,
and they did not.100

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 924.
Id.
Id.
8 U.S.C.S. § 1254(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 926.
Id.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 926–27.
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Chadha‘s deportation hearings were once again reopened and the
immigration judge set about enforcing the House‘s veto of the
suspension of deportation.101 Chadha appealed the deportation order in
front of the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals on
the grounds that Section 244(c)(2) was an unconstitutional legislative
veto.102 The Board held that it had no power to declare an act of
Congress unconstitutional and Chadha‘s appeal was dismissed.103
Chadha then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals where
he was joined by the INS in his claim that Section 244(c)(2) was
unconstitutional.104 The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Anthony
Kennedy, agreed with Chadha and struck down Section 244(c)(2) of the
Act on the grounds that it constituted a violation of the constitutional
separation of powers doctrine.105 The case was then appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.106
B. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Warren Burger issued the Court‘s six-justice majority
opinion in the Chadha case.107 Justice Powell wrote a concurring
opinion108 and Justices White109 and Rehnquist110 each wrote separate
dissents. In the majority opinion, Burger affirmed the Ninth Circuit‘s
ruling and struck down the one-house legislative veto provision
contained in Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.111
Burger‘s opinion was widely panned by many in the legal and scholarly
community.112 It was referred to by one critic as ―wooden, . . . rigid and
mechanical.‖113 Another called it ―supremely simple‖114 and a third

101. Id. at 928.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 927.
104. Id. at 928.
105. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
106. See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 960 (Powell, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1014 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 959 (majority opinion).
112. See CRAIG, supra note 19; E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative
Constitution, The Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125 (1983); Korn,
supra note 85.
113. Korn, supra note 85, at 879 (quoting Elliot, supra note 112, at 147.
114. CRAIG, supra note 19, at 141 (citing Alien’s Deportation Fight Led to Landmark
Decision, N. Y. TIMES, June 25, 1983, at pg.8).
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concluded that ―[w]hatever one‘s view about the merits, the Chadha
opinion is a disappointment.‖115
Some argued that the Court had decided the case on grounds far
broader than necessary due to the Court‘s reading of the threshold issues
involved.116 Burger‘s opinion methodically addressed questions of
jurisdiction,117 severability,118 standing,119 ripeness,120 adverseness,121 and
the political question doctrine,122 and eventually determined that
Chadha‘s case was properly before the Supreme Court.123 Having
disposed of the threshold issues, Burger turned to the constitutional issue
at hand, the legislative veto.
Burger‘s reading of the constitutional issues in question was
criticized by some legal scholars as being too formalistic.124 Others
characterized it as such primarily because it downplayed utilitarian
arguments related to the ―efficiency‖ of the legislative veto125 and was
―uncharacteristically economical and direct on the key issue of
constitutionality.‖126 Regardless, future Justice Stephen Breyer probably
spoke for many when he concluded that ―[t]he pure constitutional logic
to which the majority pointed is very difficult to overcome.‖127
Chief Justice Burger‘s opinion focused on the plain language found
in Article I governing the legislative process.128 Burger first turned to the
Presentment Clause found in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution and
concluded that the action taken by the House when it vetoed Chadha‘s
suspension of deportation was essentially legislative in nature.129 As
such, the president had a role to play. Burger noted that the Framers
purposefully included the president in the legislative process as one
check on the abuse of legislative power.130 To have a process that was
essentially legislative in character exclude any presidential input was a
115. Elliot, supra note 112, at 144.
116. Id. at 131.
117. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 920 (1983).
118. Id. at 932–35.
119. Id. at 920.
120. Id. at 936–37.
121. Id. at 921.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 931.
124. Elliott, supra note 112, at 126.
125. Korn, supra note 85, at 875.
126. Legislative Veto After Chadha: Hearings Before the Comm. on Rules H.R. 98th Cong.
212 (1983) [hereinafter APPC Hearings] (statement of Mr. Stanley Brand, former legal counsel of
H.R.).
127. Breyer, supra note 17, at 790.
128. See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919.
129. Id. at 952.
130. Id. at 947.
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violation of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3.131 While Burger conceded that
not every action taken by the House or Senate need comply with the
Presentment Clause, he contended that every one that was legislative in
nature must.132
Legislation must also be passed by majorities in both the Senate and
the House pursuant to the Bicameralism Clause also found in Article I,
Section 7.133 In Chadha‘s case, only the House voted to veto the
suspension of deportation.134 The Framers, argued the Chief Justice,
carefully defined specific instances where bicameral procedural
requirements need not be met, and the procedures in Chadha‘s case were
not among these clearly articulated exceptions.135 Burger concluded that,
in the absence of these exceptions, legislative actions must be ―exercised
in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure.‖136 Chief Justice Burger downplayed the efficacy of the
legislative veto as a useful tool for both Congress and the executive
branch. ―[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient,
and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone‖ he
opined, ―will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.‖137
C. Concurring Opinion
Justice Powell concurred with the majority‘s opinion but was
somewhat cautious about the scope of the majority‘s opinion noting that
―[t]he breadth of this holding gives one pause.‖138 Powell instead urged
the Court to decide the case on narrower grounds by making the
argument that the action taken by the House in Chadha‘s case was
judicial in nature, not legislative. Congress, Powell argued, did not enact
a rule but rather made a finding that several people did not comply in this
instance.139 ―It thus undertook the type of decision that traditionally has
been left to other branches‖ (i.e., the judiciary in this instance).140 Having
found fault with the actions of Congress on separation of powers
131. Id. at 945–47.
132. Id. at 952.
133. Id. at 921.
134. Id. at 927–28.
135. Id. at 922. There are four instances where one chamber of Congress is given explicit
power to act without the other: (1) The House is given the power to initiate impeachments, while the
Senate is given the sole power to (2) sit as a court of impeachment, (3) approve presidential
appointments, and (4) ratify treaties.
136. Id. at 951.
137. Id. at 944.
138. Id. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 964–65.
140. Id. at 965.
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grounds, Powell declined to reach the broader questions regarding the
constitutionality of legislative vetoes generally.141
D. Dissenting Opinions
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist focused primarily on the issue of
severability. In short, he disagreed with the Court‘s majority that it was
possible to just sever Section 244(c)(2) while leaving the remainder of
the Immigration and Nationality Act intact.142 Chief Justice Burger had
disposed with the severability question in short order by noting that the
Act had a severability clause which gave rise to the presumption that the
constitutionality of the entire Immigration Act did not turn on the
invalidity of any particular section of the Act.143 ―A provision is further
presumed severable,‖ wrote Burger ―if what remains after severance ‗is
fully operative as a law.‘‖144 Severing Section 244(c)(2) would leave the
remainder of the Act intact.145 To Rehnquist the matter was not so cut
and dried. While conceding that there was an explicit severability clause
in the Act, Rehnquist instead focused on the Act‘s legislative history in
reaching the conclusion that ―Congress has never indicated that it would
be willing to permit suspensions of deportation unless it could retain
some sort of veto.‖146 Unwilling to sever the potentially offending
provision or strike down the entire Immigration and Nationality Act,
Justice Rehnquist was willing to uphold the actions of the House in
Chadha‘s case and overturn the Ninth Circuit‘s opinion.147
Justice White‘s dissent focused largely on the functional importance
of the legislative veto to the political branches of government. ―Today‘s
decision,‖ he lamented, ―strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in
more laws enacted by Congress than the Court has cumulatively
invalidated in its history.‖148 Rather than ruling broadly and seemingly
striking down all forms and uses of the legislative veto, White argued
that the Court should give serious deference to the fact that the legislative
veto was an ―important if not indispensable political invention that
allows the president and Congress to resolve major constitutional and
policy differences . . . and preserves Congress‘ control over

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 967.
Id. at 1014 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 920, 932 (majority opinion).
Id. at 934 (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm‘n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
Id.
Id. at 1015 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1002 (White, J., dissenting).
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lawmaking.‖149 Without the veto, White argued, Congress was left with a
Hobson‘s Choice to either refrain from providing Executive Branch
agencies with needed discretion and flexibility, or to engage in a
―hopeless‖ task of writing laws with excruciating specificity in order to
cover every possible contingency.150 Neither was desirable nor, in
White‘s mind, feasible.151
Justice White responded to Burger‘s Presentment Clause arguments
by contending that legislative vetoes complied with the spirit of Article I,
Section 7.152 Bills containing legislative vetoes complied with the
Bicameral and Presentment Clause provisions.153 They were passed by
majorities in both houses and signed by the President.154 Exercising a
legislative veto did not enact new policy in violation of the Presentment
Clause but rather only ―negated‖ a particular executive branch action.155
White also contended that legislative vetoes were an acceptable way for
Congress to delegate power.156 Congress regularly delegates lawmaking
power to executive agencies, White reasoned.157 It would therefore seem
perfectly logical and acceptable to reserve a check (i.e., veto) on such
delegations.158
Finally, Justice White also took issue with the majority‘s
characterization of separation of powers. He argued that the Separation
of Powers Doctrine had previously only led the judiciary to invalidate a
particular government action when an express provision of the
Constitution was violated.159 The Court should not infer disapproval of
the legislative veto just because the Framers did not put it in the
Constitution.160 In this circumstance, neither the executive nor the
judiciary is prevented from carrying out their assigned constitutional
functions.161 Indeed, White noted, the Constitution provides for no
explicit executive or judicial roles in the deportation process.162
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In the end, the Ninth Circuit‘s opinion that struck down Section
244(c)(2) was upheld by the Supreme Court by a 7-2 margin.163 Soon
after the Chadha decision the Court struck down both one-house and a
two-house legislative veto provisions in Process Gas Consumers Group
v. Consumer Energy Council.164 The message appeared to be sent: The
legislative veto was dead.
V. EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONSES TO CHADHA
While in a strictly organizational sense both Congress and the
executive branch are not in a hierarchically subordinate position to the
Supreme Court, they are expected to carry out Court decisions. To what
degree can organizational theory be applied to the Chadha case? We now
turn to an examination of executive branch responses to seek an answer
to this question.
While presidential attitudes towards the legislative veto have been
described as ambivalent, all have criticized and questioned its use.165
Every Attorney General since the Hoover Administration‘s William
Mitchell has opposed the legislative veto.166 At the same time, presidents
have continued to sign bills into law that contain legislative vetoes.167
Public objections to the legislative veto begin to appear during the
Eisenhower Administration. It was during this period of time that
Congress began to increasingly use committee vetoes and ―no
appropriation‖ provisions in certain legislative areas.168 Eisenhower
himself had serious doubts about the constitutionality of the idea that
Congress could delegate a power to one of its committees that, in effect,
would give it the ability to prevent an executive action that had been
carried out pursuant to law.169 Eisenhower clashed with Congress over
the inclusion of committee vetoes in legislation such as the Military
Construction Act of 1951.170 Upon seeing a draft of the legislation,

163. Id. at 919.
164. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
165. For an exhaustive reference list of objections to the legislative veto by Presidents and
Attorneys General see John Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16
HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 735, 737 n.7 (1979).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. For a good discussion of the rise of the committee veto and presidential opposition, see
H. Lee Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CAL. L.
REV. 983, 1017–29 (1975).
169. Arthur S. Miller & George M. Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving The
Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L. J. 376, 379 (1976).
170. Military Construction Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86–500, 74 Stat. 166.
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Eisenhower sought to repeal these committee vetoes.171 When he was
unsuccessful, he threatened to order the Defense Department to ignore
them.172 Congress abruptly changed its course, replacing the committee
vetoes with report-and-wait provisions.173
A second example of this conflict came in response to the 1954
Camp Blanding Bill.174 This bill, in part, authorized the transfer of Camp
Blanding from the United States Army to the state of Florida.175 The
transfer of this and other pieces of real estate were subject to a committee
veto.176 Eisenhower‘s objections to this arrangement were forceful
enough that he vetoed the entire bill.177 Even when Eisenhower signed
legislation into law that contained vetoes, he noted his objections.
Eisenhower‘s signing statement for the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act for 1956 contained a declaration detailing his
objections to the legislative vetoes in the bill and his intention to treat
them as invalid, absent instructions from the courts to do otherwise.178
There were fewer public objections to the use of vetoes during the
Kennedy Administration.179 In fact, Kennedy routinely signed legislation
containing ―no appropriation‖ provisions while in office.180 Far more
common were presidential vetoes for bills containing legislative vetoes
or signing statements objecting to their inclusion in bills.181 This was the
general approach to the legislative veto taken by the Kennedy, Johnson,
Nixon and Ford Administrations.182 A prime example of this is the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1964.183 The bill
contained committee vetoes over certain foreign currency transactions.
President Johnson signed the bill but strongly noted his reservations

171. Watson, supra note 168, at 1022.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 100 CONG. REC. 7129, 7135 (1954).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. CRAIG, supra note 5, at 53.
179. Watson, supra note 168.
180. ―No appropriations‖ provisions are essentially a congressional check (or veto) on how the
executive branch spends money. If Congress disagrees with how an executive agency is going to
spend money to implement a program it can just cut off appropriations. It can also appropriate
money to the executive branch with conditions that it be spent (or not spent) in a certain manner.
Examples of these provisions can be found in: P.L. 87–578 (appropriations of Indian funds) and P.L.
87–703 (approval of agricultural loans to local agencies).
181. CRAIG, supra note 5, at 53.
182. Id. at 53.
183. See Extension of Public Law 480 83d Congress: Hearings on S. 1498, S. 2687 and S.
2925 Before the Comm. on Agric. and Foresty, 88th Cong. 1 (1964).
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about the constitutionality of the veto provisions in his accompanying
signing statement.184
The fight over the legislative veto appeared to be coming to a head
during the Carter Administration. In a June 21, 1978 statement to
Congress, Carter declared: ―Pending a decision by the Supreme Court, it
is my view . . . that these legislative vetoes are unconstitutional . . . . The
inclusion of such a provision in a bill will be an important factor in my
decision to sign or to veto it.‖185 When Carter‘s Attorney General held a
press conference after this announcement, reporters focused on the
potential conflict between the two branches as opposed to the role of the
legislative veto in regulatory matters.186 Carter got his answer quickly.
Within ten days Congress once again began to pass bills containing
legislative vetoes.187
In an interesting twist, Governor Ronald Reagan, running for the
presidency, supported the legislative veto during the 1980 campaign as a
tool to curb regulatory excesses.188 As a result, there was limited support
for the legislative veto in the White House at the outset of the Reagan
Administration.189 Nevertheless, Reagan Administration officials quickly
changed their tune when it became ―their‖ executive branch and the
legislative veto became a tool that Congress used to ―meddle‖ in
executive branch affairs.190
The Supreme Court handed down the Chadha decision towards the
end of Reagan‘s first term in office, a term in which he experienced a
good deal of legislative success.191 One might initially think that the
Chadha decision was a great victory for the executive branch, but most
officials quickly realized that it was going to be of little practical
value.192 The chair of the White House policy council explained that
judging from initial congressional reactions, ―[i]t was already clear that
we had nothing to gain from trying to find ways of using Chadha to alter
inter-branch relations under any of these statutes, so we just agreed that
those tainted legislative vetoes were no longer operable but that the rest
of the statute remained unaffected.‖193 Without statutory legislative
184. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Extending the Agricultural Trade and
Assistance Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 641 (October 8, 1964).
185. CRAIG, supra note 5, at 122.
186. Id. at 122–23.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 149.
189. Id.at 148–50.
190. Id.
191. THOMAS CRONIN & MICHAEL GENOVESE, THE PARADOXES OF THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY 169 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2004).
192. KORN, supra note 84.
193. Korn, supra note 85, at 885.
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vetoes to govern the delegation of administrative discretion some
observers, such as Louis Fisher, argued that informal, less public, means
would be used to achieve the same end: congressional oversight control
over executive agencies.194
Though part of the executive branch of government, executive
agencies have very different constraints on their daily activities than do
the president and top executive branch officials.195 As just noted,
presidents consistently decried the use of the legislative veto, and this
rhetoric often contained the ―tough talk‖ that presidents felt they needed
to issue in defense of their presidential prerogatives vis-à-vis
Congress.196 Executive agencies must be more practical in both word and
deed when dealing with Congress and congressional committees.197
Consequently, their approach to the Chadha decision was a more
conciliatory one.198
Despite the apparent victory handed to them in the Chadha decision,
executive agency officials did not rush to insist on strict compliance with
the Supreme Court‘s decision. The Reagan White House drafted a memo
instructing all executive agency heads to avoid unnecessary
confrontation with Congress over the legislative veto.199 Many agency
heads met with powerful committee chairmen to assure them that they
would try no ―tricks‖ and that business would be conducted largely as
before, as long as they could maintain their existing level of agency
autonomy.200 Initial post-Chadha testimony in congressional hearings
again revealed that the administration was not looking for a fight over the
legislative veto.201 Before the House Subcommittee on Administrative
Law, Deputy Attorney General Edward Schmultz maintained ―as
strongly as possible‖ that the executive branch would continue ―to
observe scrupulously the ‗reporting‘ and ‗waiting‘ features that are
central to virtually all existing legislative veto devices.‖202 He stressed
that the executive branch wanted to respond to the Chadha decision with
a ―spirit of comity and mutual respect.‖203

194. Fisher, supra note 6.
195. See CRONIN & GENOVESE, supra note 192.
196. Robert Dixon, Jr., The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a
Leash?, 56 N.C. L. REV. 429 (1978).
197. Fisher, supra note 8, at 288.
198. Korn, supra note 85 at 885.
199. Id.
200. Fisher, supra note 8, at 290–91.
201. Barton Gellman, Administration Tiptoes on Legislative Veto, WASH. POST, July 21, 1983,
at A5.
202. APPC Hearings, supra note 126, at 4, 6 (testimony of Deputy Att‘y Gen. Schmultz).
203. Id.

104

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 23

One notable, yet brief, exception occurred when Office of
Management and Budget Director Jim Miller announced shortly after the
Chadha decision that executive agencies would follow the Supreme
Court‘s lead and employ the Court‘s reasoning in Chadha. Miller sent a
memo to all agency heads advising them that they would no longer be
bound by the traditional committee reports used to ―guide‖ agency
spending since they, like the legislative veto, were neither laws nor
signed by the President.204 When Congress threatened to tie the
administration‘s hands with even stricter budgetary controls via other
means, Miller quickly rescinded his earlier statement.205
Acceptance to the legislative veto was so ingrained in the executive
branch that it appeared likely to accept vetoes even after the Chadha
decision.206 Some scholars pointed out that the equivalent of the
legislative veto would still be found in many agency manuals.207 Beyond
the desire to maintain a ―business as usual‖ approach to the relationship
between the executive and legislative branches, both sides realized that
absent the legislative veto Congress still retained a variety of oversight
tools, both formal and informal, that were useful for monitoring the
activity of executive agencies.208 One unnamed Federal Trade
Commission official lamented that Congress still had ―27 different ways
of torture.‖209 Recognition of this fact resulted in an environment where
executive agencies continued to keep Congress informed of their
activities, even when not explicitly required to, in an effort to maintain a
good working relationship between the two branches.210
Critics of the Chadha decision pointed to the beneficial ―rules of the
game‖ that the legislative veto brought to the policymaking process.211
Congress was willing to give a fair amount of discretion to the executive
branch but only if it could retain a final say over the implementation of
policy through the legislative veto.212 The executive branch received
204. War Declared Over Report Language Issue, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., June 25, 1988, at
1752.
205. OMB’s Miller Back Away From Report Language Battle, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., July 9,
1988, at 1928.
206. Robert Gilmour & Barbara Hinkson Craig, After the Congressional Veto: Assessing the
Alternatives, 3 J. PUB. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 373, 383 (1984).
207. Fisher, supra note 8, at 291.
208. See generally JOEL ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (Brookings Institute 1990); KORN, supra note 84; Fisher, supra note 8.
209. Peter Grier, Veto Decision May Unleash Regulators, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 28,
1983, at 2.
210. See generally ABERBACH, supra note 208; KORN, supra note 84; Fisher, supra note 8.
211. MARTHA LIEBLER GIBSON, WEAPONS OF INFLUENCE: THE LEGISLATIVE VETO,
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE IRONY OF REFORM 39 (Westview Press 1992); Fisher, supra
note 6.
212. Id.
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much needed and desired discretion. This allowed agencies a great deal
of freedom to operate without continually having to return to Congress to
ask for congressional approval. In turn, Congress reserved the right
through the veto to rein in any agency that deviated from congressional
intent. It is this delicate arrangement that the Court upset causing both
the executive and legislative branches to seek ways to avoid lawmaking
via the Court‘s formalistic Chadha framework.213
As noted above, all presidents voiced their objections to the
legislative veto in a number of ways even while signing bills containing
vetoes into law.214 This trend continued after the Chadha decision with
the form changing little. President George H.W. Bush‘s signing
statement accompanying the Department of Interior‘s Appropriations
Bill for 1991 read as follows:
Several provisions of H.R. 5769 purport to condition my authority, and
the authority of affected Executive Branch officials, to use funds
otherwise appropriated by the Act on the approval of various
committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate. These
provisions constitute legislative veto devices of the kind declared
unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Accordingly, I
will treat them as having no legal force or effect in this or any other
legislation in which they appear. I direct agencies confronted with these
devices to consult with the Attorney General to determine whether the
grant of authority in question is severable from the unconstitutional
condition. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684–87
215
(1987).

Similarly, in signing the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1990
President Bush remarked that the committee vetoes contained therein
would in no way condition his future actions.216 For all the rhetoric of the
signing statements, the daily cooperation between executive branch
agencies and congressional committees continued unabated. These types
of statements often served as little more than a reminder that the Chief
Executive retained certain constitutional options should he wish to
exercise them.
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Act of 1991, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1769 (Nov. 5, 1990).
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How do policymaking relationships governed by the legislative veto,
and the initial response of the Reagan Administration, illustrate executive
branch reaction to the Supreme Court‘s Chadha decision? The Court‘s
decision certainly seemed to disrupt the ―normal‖ course of business and
the relationship between executive agencies and Congress. Many
executive officials viewed the alternative (a veto-less system) with
suspicion and distrust.217 Congress was quick to remind them that it had
not only other oversight powers, but powers that could make life more
difficult for executive agencies.218 When viewed in this light it seems
reasonable that agency officials preferred the veto arrangements in place
before the Court‘s decision over an uncertain, veto-less playing field.
Agencies and officials that tried to take advantage of the Court‘s decision
found themselves bound by alternative oversight methods.219 To the
degree that they wanted to retain their autonomy and discretion, they
continued to interact with Congress as though vetoes, if not
constitutional, were still understood to be part of the policymaking
equation. It is this relationship with Congress that is a key component of
the executive branch reaction to the Court‘s decision.
We see then that both presidents and agency officials generally
opposed the veto but acquiesced to its use.220 The executive branch had
come to rely on the legislative veto for its discretion and, knowing that
Congress had other oversight tools in its arsenal, had no desire to press
the veto issue. In the next section, we will examine how Congress
responded to the Court‘s decision by scrutinizing the individual and
institutional reactions of Congress and its members.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO CHADHA
How did Congress respond to the Supreme Court‘s Chadha
decision? Why did it continue to pass legislative vetoes even after these
types of vetoes had been declared unconstitutional? This section will
explore the hypothesis that members of Congress had their own
preferences that guided their behavior and lead them to continue to pass
legislative vetoes.
Initial congressional reaction to Chadha was anything but favorable.
Immediately following the decision, member after member went to the
floor of each chamber to denounce the Court‘s actions and outline ways
217. David Broder & Cass Peterson, Supreme Court Strikes Down “Legislative Veto”; Hill’s
Hard-Won Gains of a Decade Wiped Out, WASH. POST, June 24, 1983, at A1.
218. Sharp Shifts, supra note 4.
219. See ABERBACH, supra note 208.
220. Dixon, supra note 196.
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to recapture power. Iowa Senator Charles Grassley defiantly claimed:
―When Congress is through, executive branch powers will be curtailed
and the nation will be left with a more cumbersome, less responsive
government.‖221 Legislative responses were almost instantaneous.
Seventeen committee chairmen petitioned the Rules Committee to
develop an institutional response to the Court‘s decision222 and a number
of hearings in both houses addressed the subject.223
Some reform approaches called for a joint resolution of approval for
all major regulations.224 A House proposal introduced by Trent Lott (RMS) called for a joint resolution of approval for major rules and a joint
resolution of disapproval for minor rules with provisions to make
changes in House rules to expedite consideration of regulatory rules.225
His House colleague Elliott Levitas (D-GA) proposed a blanket generic
veto that would be placed in all legislation that delegated power to
executive agencies, an approach favored by a number of congressmen.226
A constitutional amendment was even drafted to overturn the Court‘s
decision.227 Some measures provided for report-and-wait provisions.228 A
report-and-wait provision simply requires that administrative agencies
report proposed rules to Congress before implementing them229. Reportand-wait provisions differ from legislative vetoes because Congress must
pass new legislation and present it to the President for his signature if it
wishes to block an agency rule.230 The Chadha Court went to great
lengths to stress that report-and-wait provisions were constitutional.231

221. Cass Peterson & John Wilke, In Wake of “Veto” Ruling, OMB Seems Eager for Truce
with Hill, WASH. POST, June 25, 1983, at A3.
222. Legislative Veto Hearings After Chadha: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 98th
Cong. 191 (1984) [hereinafter Rules Hearings].
223. CRAIG, supra note 19, at 144.
224. See Rules Hearings, supra note 222; see also S. 1080, 98th CONG. (1984). Determination
of what a major regulation was to be based on how much spending was involved. Advocates of this
approach estimated that this would force Congress to act on roughly 40–50 regulations per year. At
the same time S. 1650, 98th CONG. (1984), provided for a joint resolution of disapproval for all
agency rules.
225. Rules Hearings, supra note 222, at 111–14; see also H.R. 3939, 98th CONG. (1984).
226. H.R. 1776, 98th CONG. (1984).
227. See S.J. Res 135, 98th CONG. (1984). For a detailed argument supporting the amendment,
see Dennis DeConcini & Robert Faucher, The Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Amendment, 21
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 29 (1984).
228. See S. 1080, 98th CONG. (1984).
229. INS V. Chadha, 462 U.S., 919, 935 (1983).
230. Id.
231. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 935. Other courts have also upheld report-and-wait provisions. See
e.g., United States v. Hanna, 153 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 1998); Hechinger v. Metro. Wash. Airports
Auth., 36 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Scampini, 911 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Litteral, 910 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1990); Lewis v. Sava, 602 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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When the dust settled none of these provisions had the support of a
congressional majority and Congress took no comprehensive approach in
responding to the Chadha decision.232 Those critical of using joint
resolutions worried about the possibility that Congress would need a
supermajority to override a presidential veto. The use of joint resolutions
to monitor executive agency rulemaking also had the potential to get
Congress bogged down in administrative minutiae.233 Generic veto
proposals languished as well, with the result being ―very much talk, very
little action.‖234
There were a number of outspoken critics of the Court‘s decision in
both houses of Congress. Elliott Levitas, a staunch supporter of the
legislative veto and a firm believer that the Court had just produced a
―train-wreck in government,‖ voiced the thoughts of many when he
boldly declared: ―I firmly believe . . . Justice White‘s dissent will
become the law of the land.‖235 Rules Committee Chairman Claude
Pepper (D-FL) agreed with Levitas and took things one step further
arguing that Congress should continue to force legislative veto-type
cases in an effort to force the Supreme Court to further specify the
bounds of Chadha or revisit the issue and chip away at the Chadha
opinion.236 He even held out hope that a change in Court personnel
would save future veto provisions.237
Trying to work around the Supreme Court‘s Chadha decision was
one thing, but open defiance (the continued passing of legislative vetoes)
was another. This defiance worried some observers. Richard Paschal
voiced the concerns of many when he stated: ―Nevertheless, while it is
appropriate to allow the Court a second look at legislation it has
previously invalidated, it may not be suitable to pass similar laws if they
are repeatedly struck down as unconstitutional by the Court.‖238 In noting
the continuing tide of legislative vetoes after the Chadha decision, one
scholar concluded: ―[The Supreme Court‘s] decision will be eroded by
open defiance and subtle evasion.‖239
Compliance with the Chadha decision was not completely absent,
however. Congress amended some statutes by deleting legislative veto
provisions from them and replacing them with joint resolutions.240 In
232.
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234.
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236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
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other cases legislative vetoes remained but went unused.241 Some
legislative vetoes were converted into informal understandings that gave
committees effective oversight control over agencies.242
As noted earlier, there was a spate of legislation introduced in both
chambers designed to respond to Chadha.243 None passed. Why? There
are several explanations. One reason is that support for the legislative
veto in Congress was far from unanimous. Anthony Beilenson (D-CA)
voiced the opinion of many when he claimed, ―I haven‘t been all that
upset by the Chadha decision. I never thought that the veto was all that
useful.‖244 Similarly, Representative Joseph Moakley (D-MA)
concluded: ―[T]he decision should not be viewed as a disaster or as a
victory for anyone.‖245
A second reason was that the majority of the leadership in both
houses supported only limited use of the legislative veto to help
Congress deal with certain troublesome issues, and they did not view it
as a useful tool for everyday oversight.246 House Minority Leader Bob
Michel (R-IL) described the legislative veto as ―kind of a cop-out,‖ a
way for Congress to defer making decisions on controversial topics.247
The Speaker of the House, Tip O‘Neill (D-MA), was described as a
―longtime foe‖ of the legislative veto.248 The leadership was cautious in
its reaction to Chadha. It did not want to rush headlong into anything
without first being sure about the ramifications for congressional
oversight.
While many focus on the continued presence of legislative vetoes in
statutes following the Chadha decision, perhaps the focus properly lies
elsewhere. It is clear that Congress continued to pass legislative vetoes in
defiance of the Court‘s decision.249 Yet at the same time, Congress made
some token efforts to modify existing veto provisions and strike
others.250 The loss of the veto prompted some scholars to fear that interbranch conflict would become both more prevalent and more public.
Martha Liebler Gibson argued that the legislative veto often prompted
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
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Congress and agencies to informally negotiate issues to an amiable
solution.251 Without the veto, she feared more frequent and more public
confrontations between the two branches.252 Most scholars, however,
feared just the opposite. As Louis Fisher has argued, what Chadha may
have done is make lawmaking ―more convoluted, cumbersome, and
covert than before,‖ driving underground legislative vetoes that were
formerly in plain sight.253 House Counsel Stanley Brand quipped: ―We‘re
about to get ‗veto by telephone.‘ Committee chairmen will call the
agencies and tell them what to do.‖254 It is precisely these ―informal
arrangements‖ with executive agencies that gave some degree of comfort
to those in Congress who lamented the loss of the legislative veto.255
Clarence Long (D-MD) noted that congressional means of oversight
consisting mainly of informal, inter-branch contacts had not really been
affected by the decision.256 Collectively, these informal pressures might
very well amount to legislative veto authority (or better).257
Representative Joe Moakley‘s (D-MA) words are telling: ―The system is
clearly not sanctioned by the Chadha decision, but that doesn‘t matter
because the system is beyond the reach of the courts as long as both
branches operate in good faith.‖258 As long as Congress and the executive
dealt in good faith they could continue to make and execute policy in a
manner which both appeared to prefer, notwithstanding the Court‘s
formalistic view of separation of powers enunciated in Chadha.259
If informal arrangements often accomplished the same purpose as the
legislative veto, why did Congress continue to pass them? The presence
of many of these veto provisions in legislation had become so common
that they were often considered a boilerplate matter.260 They were just
routinely inserted without much thought being given to their presence.
House Legal Counsel Steven Ross explained initial post-Chadha vetoes
by saying, ―Each bill isn‘t gone over with a fine-tooth comb to compare
it to what the Supreme Court said in Chadha.‖261 Justice Department
Legal Counsel Ted Olson concurred: ―It was probably not intentional to
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include legislative vetoes or expect them to be enforced. The legislation
might have been so far in the pipeline that people didn‘t catch them.‖ 262
House Counsel Stanly Brand agreed with his Justice Department
counterpart when he reminded everyone that the process of adjusting to
the Chadha decision was ―like the Queen Mary . . . [y]ou can‘t turn it
around that quickly.‖263
Others were less sanguine about giving Congress the benefit of the
doubt. In fact, one House Appropriations Committee staffer indicated
that the post-Chadha inclusion of legislative vetoes was not accidental
and that they would continue to be inserted until they were specifically
challenged in the courts.264 Having witnessed the continuing presence of
legislative vetoes through 1986, Michael Horan claims:
The continued appearance of these unconstitutional vetoes is not easy
to explain. Related committee reports make no effort to defend their
legality, and there is little or no floor discussion of the vetoes. What
might have been shrugged off as mere carelessness in legislative
draftsmanship cannot now be viewed as anything other than intentional
in light of the persistent (though occasional) use of these committee
vetoes, their number, and the fact that repeated calls by the President
265
for their elimination have gone unheeded.

It appears that many in Congress were opposed to the Supreme
Court‘s decision.266 Others realized that informal oversight measures
would serve essentially the same purpose as the legislative veto.267 Either
way, it is apparent that many members of Congress preferred the veto or
its equivalent as an oversight tool when dealing with the executive
branch. Many argued that the legislative veto was an invaluable means of
oversight for Congress, necessitated by the rise of the federal
bureaucracy.268 It was a vital tool that Congress could use when
traditional oversight methods failed.269
Louis Fisher claims that the Supreme Court never really understood
why Congress and the executive branch wanted the veto in the first
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place, thereby underestimating the full repercussions of its decision.270
Scholars Jacob Javits and Gary Klein referred to the legislative veto as
the ―most efficacious‖ congressional oversight method, arguing that it
had ―unparalleled utility.‖271 It was also certainly used with enough
frequency that it can be said many members of Congress saw it as a way
of fulfilling many of their oversight and policymaking needs.272 Strom
Thurmond‘s statement at congressional hearings following the decision
illustrated this point when he concluded: ―The veto was seen as an
effective means of controlling the constantly expanding regulatory
authority of agencies and a necessary mechanism.‖273
Stephen Breyer viewed the regulatory veto as one method of
compromise between political accountability and the necessary
complexity that is involved in regulatory decision-making.274 Viewed in
this light, the veto was a tool that Congress could use to maintain its
constitutional prerogatives vis-à-vis the other branches of government in
a changing political system.275 Martha Gibson astutely summed up this
position:
At best the legislative veto was an eminently logical accommodation to
the complexities of modern government—precisely the kind of
adaptation which the Founders had in mind when they designed our
government. At worst it was a facilitator of legislative irresponsibility,
a means to transfer the duties of elected representatives to . . . unelected
276
administrators.

She went on to explain that the legislative veto could allow Congress to
avoid the responsibility of legislating in politically sensitive areas by
delegating authority to the executive branch, and then claiming credit by
killing unpopular agency initiatives without having to offer any concrete
alternatives in return.277 To the degree that this is an accurate assessment
of the potential value of the legislative veto, it is little wonder that
members sought to retain it.
Some scholars concede that the legislative veto was a powerful
symbolic tool but argue that ―acknowledging that the legislative veto was
270. Fisher, supra note 8, at 275.
271. Jacob Javits & Gary Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A
Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455, 456 (1977).
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a powerful symbol of congressional control is a far cry from establishing
the mechanism‘s indispensability.‖278 Others, like future Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia, saw it as ―a solution in search of a problem;‖ it
did not really deal effectively with the problems surrounding the
delegation of congressional power and agency rulemaking. 279 In his
testimony before the House Rules Committee, Morris Ogul concurred,
stating that the legislative veto was ―not quantitatively and probably not
qualitatively central to the legislative efforts to oversee the
bureaucracy.‖280
Joel Aberbach‘s study of the legislative veto in Keeping a Watchful
Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight supports the contention
that the legislative veto was not the invaluable oversight tool that many
claimed.281 Of the fourteen oversight techniques examined by Aberbach,
the legislative veto ranked dead last in terms of use.282 Indeed, only 2.4%
of the staffers he surveyed reported using the legislative veto frequently
or very frequently.283 His results also revealed that the legislative veto
was only the ninth (out of fourteen) most effective oversight tool
employed by those in the 95th Congress.284 These results lead Aberbach
to postulate that the reasons the legislative veto scored so poorly as an
oversight tool was that there were many more informal, and effective,
ways of accomplishing congressional oversight goals.285 Whether
symbolic or practical, the legislative veto certainly became a favorite tool
of many members of Congress. This is despite the many questions from
the outset regarding its constitutionality and utility. Regardless, the
veto‘s powerful appeal certainly indicates a preference by many in
Congress not to give up that particular tool without a fight.
VII. THE TREASURY ACT OF 1992: POST-CHADHA POLICYMAKING IN
ACTION
The Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Act of 1992 provides an instructive look at the ways in
which legislative vetoes continued to be used long after the Chadha
278. Korn, supra note 85, at 892–93.
279. Rules Hearings, supra note 222, at 527 (statement by Antonin Scalia); see also Korn,
supra note 85, at 879; Antonin Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload,
AM. ENTERPRISE INST. J. ON GOV‘T & SOC‘Y (Nov.–Dec. 1979), at 19.
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decision.286 With Republican George H.W. Bush as President and a
Democratic-controlled Congress, the budget sessions of the late 1980s
and early 1990s were often tumultuous.287 Even without divided
government, the budget process is often one where Congress seeks as
much control over how money is spent by the executive branch as it can
get. The budget process of 1992 has been described by some as relatively
―calm,‖ but there is still evidence that Congress sought to flex its
muscles through the appropriations process.288
The Treasury Act of 1992 contained a number of legislative
vetoes.289 These vetoes were committee vetoes.290 The following
provision regarding the administration of Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
funds is illustrative:
Section 1. Not to exceed 4 per centum of any appropriation made
available to the Internal Revenue Service for the current fiscal year by
this Act may be transferred to any other Internal Revenue Service
appropriation upon advance approval of the House and Senate
291
Committees on Appropriations.

The shifting of funds by an executive agency, often called
reprogramming, from one program to another has historically been
arranged informally between Congress and agencies, but in recent years
Congress has increasingly written vetoes such as the one above into
appropriations legislation.292
Other committee vetoes included limits on the amount of funds
transferred between programs in the General Services Administration,
limits on the amount that presidential appointees could spend on
redecorating their offices without advance approval of the
Appropriations Committees, and requirements that facility maintenance
for certain federal buildings be approved in advance by the
Appropriations Committees.293 These types of vetoes attempted to codify
Appropriations Committee reports, which are increasingly used to
286. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102–141, 105 Stat. 861 (1992) [hereinafter Treasury Act].
287. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 211 (rev. ed.
Brookings Inst. Press 2000).
288. Id. at 4.
289. Treasury Act, supra note 286; For example, Title VI limits the amount of funds that can
be used to redecorate the offices of presidential appointees without specific advance approval by the
Appropriations Committees.
290. Id.
291. Id. For an example see Title I, Administrative Provision—Internal Revenue Service, § 1.
292. SCHICK, supra note 287, at 248.
293. See Treasury Act, supra note 286.
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micromanage the spending authority of executive branch agencies.294 In
discussing this process, Allen Schick notes that these committee reports
are often not binding legally, but the reality is that few agencies want to
cross Congress and ignore these reports.295
The appropriateness of such veto provisions was, in an unusual
move, protested on the floor of the House during the debate of H.R.
2622. Representative James Traficant (D-OH), unhappy that an
amendment of his was stripped from the bill, raised dozens of
parliamentary objections to provisions in the Appropriations bill that
caused debate to drag on for hours.296 Representative Traficant noted that
a significant portion of the bill (including the legislative veto
provisions—though he didn‘t mention these by name) conditioned
funding for programs or agencies on certain Executive (in)actions. 297He
successfully argued that this amounted to putting legislation in an
appropriations bill in violation of House rules.298
Traficant‘s actions eventually turned out to be a quixotic attempt to
buck the desires of congressional leadership. Allen Schick‘s discussion
of the budget process notes that such conditional spending directions in
Appropriations bills, while probably not appropriate, will likely remain
there when the leadership desires it.299 In this case, they did, and all the
language stricken from the bill on the floor of the House reappeared in
the House-Senate conference committee report on the bill.300 The
Treasury Act of 1992 passed the House and the Senate on a voice vote in
each chamber on October 3, 1991.301 The veto provisions had been
restored in their entirety without a single word being mentioned about
their presence in any of the debate on the bill.302
Predictably, President Bush commented on these veto provisions
when he signed the bill into law on October 28, 1991. He wrote:
A number of provisions in the Act condition the President‘s authority,
and the authority of affected executive branch officials, to use funds
otherwise appropriated by this Act on the approval of various
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committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate. These
provisions constitute legislative vetoes similar to those declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha.
Accordingly, I will treat them as having no legal force or effect in this
303
or any other legislation in which they appear.

In essence, the ―dance‖ was complete. Congress used the vetoes to
condition executive branch spending. The President noted that they could
not legally do this. Despite the President‘s proclamation, executive
agencies surely took note of the congressional ―recommendations.‖304
The manner in which these vetoes were included surely indicates that the
congressional leadership placed a value on them. In an era of divided and
occasionally acrimonious government, the limits on presidential
appointee office redecoration were probably just an inter-branch dig at
the other party. As noted earlier, there was no public discussion of these
veto provisions. Their presence and the fact that they were incorporated
into Appropriations bills would apparently reflect Congress‘ desire to
keep a very close eye on certain executive branch activities.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A number of political and legal scholars have used organizational
theory to explain the implementation and impact of judicial decisions.
One of the hypotheses often put forward is that agencies responsible for
the implementation of judicial policies often have organizational
preferences of their own that outweigh their motivations to comply with
court decisions.305 This article has applied the above hypothesis to the
Supreme Court‘s decision to strike down the legislative veto in INS v.
Chadha. There is some evidence to support that conclusion when
analyzing executive agency response to the Court‘s Chadha decision. On
its face, the executive branch was handed what appeared to be a victory
from which it would vigorously seek to gain advantage.306 This did not
turn out to be the case as agencies continued to acquiesce both to
congressional passage of legislative vetoes and informal veto-like
arrangements.307 To do so was the price for their precious, and preferred,
autonomy. Although we are looking at separate, co-equal branches of
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government, these agencies, at least in theory, appeared bound to
implement the Court‘s decision. Our examination supports the contention
that they were complicit in a failure to do so. They preferred the ―old‖
pre-Chadha system and took actions (or failed to act) in order to preserve
it.308
Congress was also responsible for implementing the Court‘s
decision, yet it continued to pass legislative vetoes.309 Again, we have
seen where many members apparently found the legislative veto to be an
indispensable tool for Congress in the oversight of executive agencies.310
Others, including congressional leaders, were less inclined to rush into a
comprehensive response to Chadha. They quickly reminded executive
branch officials that other formal and informal oversight methods
remained and that Chadha would result in no functional change in the
relationship between the two branches.311 Congress would continue to
pass vetoes and retain the functional equivalent in areas where vetoes
were modified or deleted. It too preferred the ―old‖ system and resisted
implementation of the decision in a variety of subtle and not so subtle
ways as the Treasury Act of 1992 illustrates.
The findings in this particular case appear to support the theory that
courts may have difficulty in gaining compliance with their decisions
when those responsible for implementing them have preferences that
clearly differ from those of the court. In this case we see an unpopular
Supreme Court decision and responses by both Congress and the
executive branch reflecting their desire to retain the old status quo.
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